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Abstract
In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games
with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by
applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TU-
game is obtained by taking the Myerson graph restricted game and of that the Kamijo
partition restricted game. In this game the dividend of any coalition that is neither a
subset of a union nor a union of unions is zero. The partition-graph restricted TU-game
is obtained by taking the partition restricted game and of that the graph restricted game.
In this game the dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero. We
apply the values to an economic example in which the players in a union represent the
cities in a country and the graph represents a network of natural gas pipelines between the
cities.
Keywords: Cooperative games, coalition structures, graphs, Shapley value.
JEL code: C71
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility in characteristic function form, or simply
a TU-game, is a rudimentary model of cooperation among (economic) agents. TU-games
were introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and have since become a central
object of study in the field of cooperative game theory. An important objective in this
field is the determination of a value for each agent, referred to as player, in a TU-game.1
Unlike strategic solution concepts, values are usually defined axiomatically. Some desirable
properties are stated and it is shown that there exists a unique value that satisfies these
properties. For instance, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), one of the principal values
in cooperative game theory, is the unique value that satisfies the axioms of ‘symmetry’,
‘carrier’ and ‘additivity’.
Aumann and Dre`ze (1974) were one of the first to consider restrictions on cooperation
possibilities of players in a TU-game by partitioning the set of players in a number of a
priori unions (elements of the partition). Nowadays, TU-games with a partition of the
set of players are known as TU-games with coalition structure, or TU-games with a priori
unions. To obtain a value for a TU-game with coalition structure, Aumann and Dre`ze
(1974) assumed that the players in the game are only allowed to cooperate within their
own union. They applied, for each union, the Shapley value to the subgame within the
union.
Owen (1977) proposed a different value for TU-games with coalition structure. He
considered the situation in which all players in the game are allowed to cooperate, but a
subset of players within a union can only cooperate with complete other unions. The Owen
value for TU-games with coalition structure can be obtained by applying the Shapley value
twice. First, to a game between the unions, assigning a value to each union, and then to
a game within the union, distributing the value of a union among its players.
Recently, Kamijo (2011) has introduced a new value for TU-games with coalition struc-
ture. The main difference between this value and the Owen value is that unions are only
allowed to cooperate when all players in the unions agree (i.e., only complete unions can
cooperate). Kamijo’s new approach provides a so-called restricted TU-game in which the
worth of an arbitrary coalition of players is equal to the worth of the union of all complete
unions within the coalition, plus the sum of the worths of all remaining parts of the coali-
tion that are not complete unions. We call this restricted game the partition restricted
game. The value proposed by Kamijo (2011) assigns to every game in coalition structure
the Shapley value of the partition restricted game. Kamijo (2011) showed that his value
is the unique value that satisfies the axioms of ‘efficiency’, ‘balanced contributions’ and
1Shapley (1953) describes a value as providing for each player an a priori assessment of the utility of
becoming involved in a game.
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‘collective balanced contributions’.
A different form of restrictions on TU-games was considered by Myerson (1977). In
his model the restrictions in the game are not given by a partition of the set of players
but by the links in an undirected (communication) graph. Players are only allowed to
cooperate in a coalition when they are connected in a graph, thus, when there exists a
set of links (edges) in the graph that connects the cooperating players. TU-games with
this kind of restrictions are known as TU-games with graph structure, or TU-games with
graph restricted communication. The approach of Myerson (1977) gives a different kind
of restricted game than the partition restricted game. The Myerson, or graph, restricted
game is the TU-game in which the worth of a coalition is equal to the sum of the worths
of its maximally connected subsets. The Myerson value is defined as the Shapley value of
the graph restricted game. Myerson (1977) showed that his value is the unique value that
satisfies the axioms of ‘component efficiency’ and ‘fairness’.
Va´zquez-Brage, Garc´ıa-Jurado and Carreras (1996) combined the ideas of Aumann
and Dre`ze (1974) and Myerson (1977) in TU-games with coalition and graph structure, or
TU-games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. As a value for such
games they proposed the Owen value (the value taking into account the partition into a
priori unions) of the Myerson restricted game (the game taking into account the graph on
the set of players). Alonso-Meijide, A´lvarez-Mozos and Fiestras-Janeiro (2009) suggested
two other values for TU-games with coalition and graph structure. They applied Banzhaf
(1965) type modifications of the Owen value to the Myerson restricted game.
In this paper we propose two new values for TU-games with coalition and graph struc-
ture. They are obtained by applying the Shapley value to two restricted games associated
with a TU-game with coalition and graph structure. The two restricted games combine
the ideas of Myerson (1977) and Kamijo (2011). The first is called the graph-partition
restricted game and is the partition restricted game of the graph restricted game. That
is, first the graph structure is taken into account to obtain the graph restricted game, and
then the partition structure is taken into account by taking the partition restricted game
of the graph restricted game. The second is called the partition-graph restricted game
and is obtained the other way around: it is the graph restricted game of the partition
restricted game. It follows from Owen (1986) that for a partition-graph restricted game
the (Harsanyi) dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero.2 For
a graph-partition restricted game it is shown that the dividend of every coalition that is
neither a subset of a union, nor a union of unions is zero. This implies that, in general,
2The (Harsanyi) dividend of a coalition is the additional contribution of cooperation among the players
in a coalition, that they did not already realize by cooperating in smaller coalitions, see Harsanyi (1963).
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the graph-partition restricted game is not equal to the partition-graph restricted game.
The two new values are defined as the Shapley values of the two types of restricted
game. We show that the Shapley value of the graph-partition restricted game is character-
ized by the axioms of ‘graph efficiency’, ‘balanced contributions’ and ‘collective balanced
contributions’. The Shapley value of the partition-graph restricted game is characterized
by the axioms of ‘partition component efficiency’ and ‘fairness’.
To assess the usefulness of our two new values we apply them to an economic example.
In this example the players can be viewed as cities that cooperate together within countries,
being the a priori unions of the coalition structure, and the graph between the players can
be viewed as a network of natural gas (or oil) pipelines between the cities.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall TU-games, TU-games with
graph structure and TU-games with coalition structure. In Section 3 we introduce the two
restricted games associated to a game with coalition and graph structure. In Section 4
we consider the two solutions that are obtained by applying the Shapley value to the two
restricted games, and provide axiomatic characterizations. We also compare the charac-
terizing sets of axioms with the axioms for the Myerson value (only taking into account
the graph structure) and the value proposed in Kamijo (2011) (only taking into account
the coalition structure). In Section 5 we apply the new values to an economic example and
compare the outcomes to other values. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Cooperative games
2.1 TU-games
A cooperative game with transferable utility in characteristic function form, or TU-game,
is a pair (N, v), where N ⊂ IN is a finite set of n = |N | ≥ 2 players (agents) and v : 2N → IR
is a characteristic function on N such that v(∅) = 0. We denote the collection of all TU-
games by G. A subset S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, is called a coalition. For any coalition S, v(S)
displays the worth of that coalition. The worth of a coalition can be interpreted as the
wealth, measured in units of transferable utility, which the members of coalition S are able
to divide among themselves when they decide to cooperate. For S ⊂ N , the game (S, vS)
denotes the subgame restricted to S with characteristic function vS(T ) = v(T ) for every
T ⊆ S. For arbitrary K ⊂ IN, we denote IRK as the |K|-dimensional Euclidean space with
elements x ∈ IRK having components xi, i ∈ K.
A special class of TU-games is the class of unanimity games. For each nonempty
T ⊆ N , the unanimity game (N, uT ) is given by the player set N and characteristic function
uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. It is known that for every (N, v) ∈ G,
the characteristic function v can be written as a linear combination of the characteristic
3
functions of the unanimity games (N, uT ) in a unique way: v =
∑
T∈2N\{∅}∆v(T )u
T , where
∆v(T ), T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, are the (Harsanyi) dividends, see Harsanyi (1963). By definition
of the unanimity games it follows that v(S) =
∑
T⊆S ∆v(T ), i.e., the worth v(S) is equal
to the dividend of S plus the sum of the dividends of all its proper subcoalitions. The
dividend of S thus can be interpreted as the additional contribution of cooperation among
the players in S, that they did not already realize by cooperating in smaller coalitions.
Using the Mo¨bius transform it follows that
∆v(T ) =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)|T |−|S|v(S), T ∈ 2N\{∅}.
A value f on G assigns a unique payoff vector f(N, v) ∈ IRN to every TU-game (N, v) ∈
G. A value is efficient if it distributes v(N), thus, if ∑i∈N fi(N, v) = v(N) for every
(N, v) ∈ G. The best-known efficient value is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). This value,
denoted by Sh, equally distributes the dividends among the players in the corresponding
coalitions: for every TU-game (N, v) ∈ G,
Shi(N, v) =
∑
{T⊆N | i∈T}
∆v(T )
|T | , i ∈ N.
2.2 TU-games with graph structure
A graph is a pair (N,L) where N is a set of nodes and L ⊆ {{i, j}|i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is a set
of unordered pairs of distinct elements of N . In this paper the nodes represent the players
in a game (N, v). We therefore refer to them as players. The elements of L are called links
or edges. If there is no confusion about the player set N , we will write a graph (N,L)
just by its set of links L. We denote the set of all graphs on N by LN . For S ⊆ N , the
graph (S, L(S)) with L(S) = {{i, j} ∈ L|i, j ∈ S} is called the subgraph of L on S. Given
L ∈ LN , a sequence of k different players (i1, ..., ik) is a path in L(S) if {il, il+1} ∈ L(S) for
l = 1, ..., k − 1. Two players i, j ∈ S are called connected in L(S) if i = j or there exists a
path (i1, ..., ik) in L(S) with i1 = i and ik = j. A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be a connected
coalition (or connected in L) if every two players in S are connected in L(S). A coalition
K ⊆ N is a component of (N,L) if and only if (i) K is connected in L, and (ii) K ∪ {i} is
not connected in L for every i ∈ N\K. The set of components of (S, L(S)) is denoted by
CL(S). Note that every player in S ⊆ N that is not linked with any other player in S is a
(singleton) component in (S, L(S)).
A TU-game with graph structure is a triple (N, v, L) with (N, v) ∈ G and L ∈ LN
a graph on N . We denote the collection of all TU-games with graph structure (N, v, L)
by GG. Following Myerson (1977), in a game with graph structure (N, v, L) ∈ GG, a
coalition S is only able to realize its worth v(S) if S is connected in L. When S is not
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connected in L, the players in S can realize the sum of the worths of the components of
the subgraph (S, L(S)). Given a TU-game (N, v) ∈ G and a graph L ∈ LN , the Myerson
or graph restricted game induced by L is the TU-game (N, vL) ∈ G with player set N and
characteristic function
vL(S) =
∑
T∈CL(S)
v(T ) for all S ⊆ N.
A value f on GG assigns a unique payoff vector f(N, v, L) ∈ IRN to every (N, v, L) ∈ GG.
The Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) of a TU-game with graph structure, denoted by My,
is defined as the value that assigns to every (N, v, L) ∈ GG the Shapley value of the
corresponding graph restricted game (N, vL). That is, for every (N, v, L) ∈ GG the Myerson
value is defined as My(N, v, L) = Sh(N, vL). Myerson (1977) axiomatized this value for
games with graph structure by ‘component efficiency’ and ‘fairness’.
2.3 TU-games with coalition structure
Let PN be the set of partitions of N . So, for some m ≤ |N |, P = {P1, ..., Pm} ∈ PN if
and only if (i)
⋃m
i=1 Pi = N , (ii) Pk 6= ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and (iii) Pk ∩ Pl = ∅ for
all k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with k 6= l. For a given P = {P1, ..., Pm} ∈ PN , let M = {1, ...,m}.
Then P = {Pj|j ∈ M} is called a coalition structure, or a system of a priori unions, and
any element Pj, j ∈ M , is called a union of P . A TU-game with coalition structure is a
triple (N, v, P ) with (N, v) ∈ G and P ∈ PN a partition of N . We denote the collection
of all TU-games with coalition structure by GC . A value f on GC assigns a unique payoff
vector f(N, v, P ) ∈ IRN to every TU-game with coalition structure (N, v, P ) ∈ GC .
Aumann and Dre`ze (1974) assume that every union in P acts as a stand-alone coalition.
One can obtain the Aumann-Dre`ze value by applying to every Pj, j ∈M , the Shapley value
to the subgame (Pj, vPj). By efficiency of the Shapley value, the total payoff assigned to the
players in Pj is equal to v(Pj). Since in general
∑
j∈M v(Pj) 6= v(N), the Aumann-Dre´ze
value is not efficient.
The best-known efficient value for games with coalition structure is the Owen value,
Owen (1977). One can obtain the Owen value of a TU-game with coalition structure by
applying the Shapley value twice.3 To do so, first define the quotient game of (N, v, P ) as
the game (M, vP ) with player set M and characteristic function vP (Q) = v(∪h∈Q Ph) for
every Q ⊆ M . Then, consider the TU-game (Pk, vk) with player set Pk and characteristic
function vk which is obtained by assigning to every coalition S ⊆ Pk the Shapley value
3See also van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) in which Owen-type values for the class of games with
coalition structures are given that determine the individual payoff shares as the multiplicative product of
two shares in the total payoff.
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payoff of player k ∈ M in a modified quotient game in which Pk is replaced by S ⊆ Pk.
Next, for each k ∈M , the Shapley value is applied to the game (Pk, vk) to obtain the Owen
payoffs of the players i ∈ Pk: Owi(N, v, P ) = Shi(Pk, vk), i ∈ Pk, k ∈M . The Owen value
is efficient, because by efficiency of the Shapley value we have that
∑
i∈Pk Owi(N, v, P ) =
vk(Pk) = Shk(M, v
P ) and
∑
k∈M Shk(M, v
P ) = v(N).
In this paper we follow the approach of Kamijo (2011) by assuming that individual
players are able to cooperate within their union, but need their full union in order to
cooperate with players from outside their union. Thus, given a partition P ∈ PN , players
in any coalition S ⊆ Pj ∈ P can cooperate with each other and obtain the worth of the
coalition v(S). In addition, there is the possibility of cooperation among players in different
unions, but only if all players in these unions cooperate. Let S ⊂ Pj ∈ P and Pk ∈ P ,
Pk 6= Pj. While Pj and Pk can obtain their worth v(Pj∪Pk) when they decide to cooperate,
S and Pk can obtain only v(S) + v(Pk) because all players in Pj and Pk are necessary in
establishing cooperation between these unions.
Given P = {Pj | j ∈M} ∈ PN , for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, denote
S/P = {∪{k∈M |S∩Pk=Pk} Pk} ∪ {S ∩ Pk | S ∩ Pk 6= Pk, k ∈M}.
Hence, S/P is a collection of disjunct sets with as elements the union of all complete
unions Pk that are contained in S, and the sets S ∩ Pk, for every union that contains
players outside S. Given a TU-game (N, v) ∈ G and a partition P ∈ PN , the partition
restricted game induced by coalition structure P is the TU-game (N, v|P ) with player set
N and characteristic function
v|P (S) =
∑
T∈S/P
v(T ), for all S ⊆ N.
The value for TU-games with coalition structure proposed by Kamijo (2011), called the
collective value and denoted by Ka, assigns to every TU-game with coalition structure
(N, v, P ) the Shapley value of the corresponding partition restricted game (N, v|P ). Thus,
for every (N, v, P ) ∈ GC the collective value is defined by Ka(N, v, P ) = Sh(N, v|P ).
Kamijo (2011) axiomatized this value by ‘efficiency’, ‘balanced contributions’ and ‘collective
balanced contributions’.
3 The graph-partition and partition-graph restricted
games
A TU-game with coalition and graph structure is a quadruple (N, v, L, P ) with (N, v) ∈ G
a TU-game, L ∈ LN a graph and P ∈ PN a partition of N . We denote the collection of
all TU-games with coalition and graph structure by GCG.
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Figure 1: N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, L = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}, P = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}
With each TU-game with coalition and graph structure we associate two restricted TU-
games. These restricted games take into account both the cooperation restrictions arising
from the partition as well as those arising from the graph. First, we define the graph-
partition restricted game induced by L and P . This game associates to every (N, v, L, P ) ∈
GCG the corresponding TU-game (N, vL|P ). So, given (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG, the graph-
partition restricted game is obtained by first taking the graph restricted game vL of (N, v, L)
and then the partition restricted game of (N, vL, P ). Second, the partition-graph restricted
game is defined the other way around and associates to every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG the
corresponding TU-game (N, (v|P )L). So, given (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG, the partition-graph
restricted game is obtained by first taking the partition restricted game v|P of (N, v, P )
and then the graph restricted game of (N, v|P , L).
In general, the game (N, vL|P ) can differ from the game (N, (v|P )L), and thus the order
in which we apply the cooperation restrictions matters. This is illustrated in the next
example.
Example 3.1 Let (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG be such that N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, L = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}
and P = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, as displayed in Figure 1. Then vL|P (S) and (v|P )L(S), S ⊆ N ,
are as given in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In the last column of both tables the dividends are
given. For readability, in the tables we write v({i, . . . , j}) as v(i, . . . , j). 2
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S vL(S) vL|P (S) ∆vL|P (S)
∅ v(∅) vL(∅) = v(∅) 0
1 v(1) vL(1) = v(1) v(1)
2 v(2) vL(2) = v(2) v(2)
3 v(3) vL(3) = v(3) v(3)
4 v(4) vL(4) = v(4) v(4)
1, 2 v(1) + v(2) vL(1, 2) = v(1) + v(2) 0
1, 3 v(1, 3) vL(1) + vL(3) = v(1) + v(3) 0
1, 4 v(1) + v(4) vL(1) + vL(4) = v(1) + v(4) 0
2, 3 v(2, 3) vL(2) + vL(3) = v(2) + v(3) 0
2, 4 v(2) + v(4) vL(2) + vL(4) = v(2) + v(4) 0
3, 4 v(3) + v(4) vL(3, 4) = v(3) + v(4) 0
1, 2, 3 v(1, 2, 3) vL(1, 2) + vL(3) = v(1) + v(2) + v(3) 0
1, 2, 4 v(1) + v(2) + v(4) vL(1, 2) + vL(4) = v(1) + v(2) + v(4) 0
1, 3, 4 v(1, 3) + v(4) vL(1) + vL(3, 4) = v(1) + v(3) + v(4) 0
2, 3, 4 v(2, 3) + v(4) vL(2) + vL(3, 4) = v(2) + v(3) + v(4) 0
N v(1, 2, 3) + v(4) vL(N) = v(1, 2, 3) + v(4) v(1, 2, 3)− v(1)
−v(2)− v(3)
Table 3.2 Characteristic function and dividends of vL|P .
S v|P (S) (v|P )L(S) ∆(v|P )L(S)
∅ v(∅) v|P (∅) = v(∅) 0
1 v(1) v|P (1) = v(1) v(1)
2 v(2) v|P (2) = v(2) v(2)
3 v(3) v|P (3) = v(3) v(3)
4 v(4) v|P (4) = v(4) v(4)
1, 2 v(1, 2) v|P (1) + v|P (2) = v(1) + v(2) 0
1, 3 v(1) + v(3) v|P (1, 3) = v(1) + v(3) 0
1, 4 v(1) + v(4) v|P (1) + v|P (4) = v(1) + v(4) 0
2, 3 v(2) + v(3) v|P (2, 3) = v(2) + v(3) 0
2, 4 v(2) + v(4) v|P (2) + v|P (4) = v(2) + v(4) 0
3, 4 v(3, 4) v|P (3) + v|P (4) = v(3) + v(4) 0
1, 2, 3 v(1, 2) + v(3) v|P (1, 2, 3) = v(1, 2) + v(3) v(1, 2)
−v(1)− v(2)
1, 2, 4 v(1, 2) + v(4) v|P (1) + v|P (2) + v|P (4) = v(1) + v(2) + v(4) 0
1, 3, 4 v(1) + v(3, 4) v|P (1, 3) + v|P (4) = v(1) + v(3) + v(4) 0
2, 3, 4 v(2) + v(3, 4) v|P (2, 3) + v|P (4) = v(2) + v(3) + v(4) 0
N v(N) v|P (1, 2, 3) + v|P (4) = v(1, 2) + v(3) + v(4) 0
Table 3.3 Characteristic function and dividends of (v|P )L.
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Given a game with graph structure (N, v, L) ∈ GG, Owen (1986) has shown that for
the corresponding graph restricted game (N, vL) the dividend ∆vL(S) is equal to zero for
any coalition S that is not connected in L. Since the partition-graph restricted game is
defined as the graph restricted game of the partition restricted game, we have that in a
partition-graph restricted game the dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the
graph is zero.
Corollary 3.4 For every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG and S ∈ 2N\{∅}, if S is not connected in L
then ∆(v|P )L(S) = 0.
The corollary does not hold for the graph-partition restricted game (N, vL|P ). For in-
stance, in Example 3.1 we have that S = N is not connected, but ∆vL|P (N) = v({1, 2, 3})−
v({1}) − v({2}) − v({3}). To find the counterpart of Corollary 3.4 for (N, vL|P ), we first
consider games with coalition structure (N, v, P ) ∈ GC . For a fixed player set N , let GN
denote the collection of all TU-games on N . Then, for P = {Pj | j ∈ M} ∈ PN , define
the mapping ZP : GN → GN by
ZP (v) = v|P .
So, ZP maps each characteristic function v ∈ GN to characteristic function v|P ∈ GN .
Because the elements of the collection S/P are fixed, ZP is a linear mapping. In order
to investigate the behavior of the mapping ZP we consider the images of the unanimity
games (N, uT ). It is not hard to see that if there is a j ∈ M with T ⊆ Pj, or there is a
Q ⊆ M such that T = ∪q∈Q Pq, then ZP (uT ) = uT . But, if T is not of this form, then
we have uT |P (S) =
∑
R∈S/P u
T (R) =
∑
{R∈S/P |T⊆R} u
T (R) for all S ∈ 2N\{∅}. Hence,
ZP (u
T ) = dT , where dT is the game given by
dT (S) =
{
1 if there is an R ∈ S/P such that T ⊆ R ⊆ S,
0 otherwise.
Since v =
∑
S∈2N\{∅}∆v(S) u
S for any game (N, v) ∈ G, it holds that
dT =
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
∆dT (S)u
S.
Note that ∆dT (S) = 0 unless T ⊆ S. In addition we have the next proposition.
Proposition 3.5 Let P = {Pj|j ∈ M} be a partition of N and S ⊆ N . If there is no
j ∈ M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆ M such that S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq, then ∆dT (S) = 0 for
all T ∈ 2N\{∅}.
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Proof. The proof proceeds along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 2 in Owen (1986).
Let S ∈ 2N\{∅} be such that there is no j ∈M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆M with
S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq. Let T ∈ 2N\{∅} be arbitrary.
If T 6⊆ S, then dT (H) = 0 for all H ⊆ S. So, ∆dT (S) = 0. Also, if T ⊆ S but there is
no R ∈ S/P with T ⊆ R ⊆ S, then dT (H) = 0 for all H ⊆ S. Again, ∆dT (S) = 0.
Next, suppose that T ⊆ S and there is R ∈ S/P with T ⊆ R ⊆ S. For H ⊆ S, write
H = H1 ∪H2 with H1 ⊆ R and H2 ⊆ S\R. It is not difficult to see that dT (H) = dT (H1).
Then,
∆dT (S) =
∑
H⊆S
(−1)|S|−|H|dT (H)
=
∑
H1⊆R
∑
H2⊆S\R
(−1)|R|−|H1|(−1)|S|−|R|−|H2|dT (H1)
=
∑
H1⊆R
(−1)|R|−|H1|dT (H1)
[ ∑
H2⊆S\R
(−1)|S|−|R|−|H2|
]
=
∑
H1⊆R
(−1)|R|−|H1|dT (H1)
[|S|−|R|∑
r2=0
(−1)|S|−|R|−r2
(|S| − |R|
r2
)]
, (3.1)
where the last equality follows because S\R has (|S|−|R|
r2
)
subsets of cardinality r2. A lemma
in Owen (1986), that follows directly from the binomial expansion of (−1+1)n, states that
for any integer n ≥ 0,
n∑
k=0
(−1)n−k
(
n
k
)
=
{
0 if n ≥ 1,
1 if n = 0.
(3.2)
Because there is no j ∈ M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆ M with S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq, and
R ∈ S/P (so that there is a j ∈ M with R ⊆ Pj, or there is a Q ⊆ M with R =
⋃
q∈Q Pq)
it holds that S\R 6= ∅, and thus |S| − |R| ≥ 1. It then follows from (3.2) that the last
bracket in equation (3.1) is zero. It can be concluded that ∆dT (S) = 0. 2
Let S be defined by
S = {S ⊆ N | S ⊆ Pj for some j ∈M} ∪ {S ⊆ N | S = ∪q∈Q Pq for some Q ⊆M}.
Then Proposition 3.5 leads to the next theorem.
Theorem 3.6 Let P = {Pj|j ∈ M} be a partition of N . Then the unanimity games uS,
S ∈ S, form a basis for the image of ZP .
Proof. It follows from Proposition 3.5 that the image ZP (u
T ) of any unanimity game uT
is a linear combination of unanimity games uS, S ∈ S. Additionally, if S ∈ S, then uS is
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its own image. This implies that the uS, S ∈ S, span the image space and, because they
are independent, form a basis for it. 2
It follows from Theorem 3.6 that ∆v|P (S) = 0 for any coalition S such that there is
no j ∈ M with S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆ M such that S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq. That is, any
coalition that is neither a subset of a union, nor a union of unions has a zero dividend in the
partition-restricted TU-game. Since the graph-partition restricted game is defined as the
partition restricted game of the graph restricted game, we have that in a graph-partition
restricted game the dividend of any coalition that is neither a subset of a union, nor a
union of unions is zero.
Corollary 3.7 For every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG and S ∈ 2N\{∅}, if there is no j ∈ M with
S ⊆ Pj, and there is no Q ⊆M such that S =
⋃
q∈Q Pq, then ∆vL|P (S) = 0.
This corollary does not hold for the partition-graph restricted game (N, (v|P )L). For
instance, in Example 3.1 we have that S = {1, 2, 3} is not a subset of any Pj and S 6=⋃
q∈Q Pq for all Q ⊆M . However, ∆(v|P )L({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2})− v({1})− v({2}).
4 Two values for TU-games with coalition and graph
structure
A value f on GCG assigns a unique payoff vector f(N, v, L, P ) ∈ IRn to every TU-game
with coalition and graph structure (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG. We introduce two new values for
TU-games with coalition and graph structure by applying the Shapley value to the two
restricted games defined in the previous section.
Definition 4.1
1. The graph-partition value on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
is the value φ assigning to every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG the payoff vector φ(N, v, L, P ) =
Sh(N, vL|P ).
2. The partition-graph value on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
is the value ψ assigning to every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG the payoff vector ψ(N, v, L, P ) =
Sh(N, (v|P )L).
Note that φ(N, v, L, P ) = Ka(N, vL, P ) and that ψ(N, v, L, P ) = My(N, v|P , L). Be-
cause vL|P does not have to be equal to (v|P )L, in general φ(N, v, L, P ) is not equal to
ψ(N, v, L, P ).
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Example 4.2 Let (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG be as in Example 3.1. From the dividends derived
in that example it follows straightforwardly that the graph-partition value is given by
φi(N, v, L, P ) = v({i}) + 1
4
[v({1, 2, 3})− v({1})− v({2})− v({3})], i = 1, 2, 3, 4
and that the partition-graph value is given by
ψj(N, v, L, P ) = v({j}) + 1
3
[v({1, 2})− v({1})− v({2})], j = 1, 2, 3,
and ψ4(N, v, L, P ) = v({4}). 2
It is obvious that for special structures we obtain the Myerson value or Kamijo’s col-
lective value. By definition, the Myerson value only takes into account the graph structure
and ignores the coalition structure. Therefore the graph-partition value is equal to the
Myerson value when P = {N}.
Proposition 4.3 Let (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG. If P = {N} then φ(N, v, L, P ) = My(N, v, L).
The collective value of Kamijo (2011) only takes into account the coalition structure and
ignores the graph structure. Therefore the partition-graph value is equal to the collective
value when L is the complete graph.
Proposition 4.4 Let (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG. If L = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} then
ψ(N, v, L, P ) = Ka(N, v, P ).
The two values defined above for games with coalition and graph structure are based on
two different restricted games. Both restricted games are obtained by applying the methods
of Myerson (1977) and Kamijo (2011), but in different orders. To characterize these two
values we generalize the axiomatizations of the Myerson value for graph restricted games
(Myerson, 1977) and the collective value for partition restricted games (Kamijo, 2011) to
the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure.
4.1 Characterization of the graph-partition value
The efficiency property as implicitly used in Kamijo (2011) states that players in N dis-
tribute the worth v(N) among themselves. Here we formulate this axiom in the context of
games with coalition and graph structure.
Axiom 4.5 Efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG is efficient if
for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG it holds that
∑
i∈N fi(N, v, L, P ) = v(N).
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The graph-partition value does not satisfy this axiom in general. However, it satisfies
a weaker version stating that the players in N distribute the sum of the worths of the
connected components of L among themselves. This takes into account that in a game
with graph structure players can only cooperate when they are connected in the graph.
Axiom 4.6 Graph efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG is graph efficient
if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG it holds that
∑
i∈N fi(N, v, L, P ) =
∑
K∈CL(N) v(K).
Clearly, when N is connected in L, then for every solution f satisfying graph efficiency it
holds that
∑
i∈N fi(N, v, L, P ) = v(N).
Next we generalize the balanced contributions axiom for TU-games with coalition struc-
ture used in Kamijo (2011) to the setting of TU-games with coalition and graph structure.
It states that, given that the coalition structure is given by P = {N}, the loss in value
that player i ∈ N experiences when player j ∈ N leaves the game is equal to the loss that
player j experiences when player i leaves the game.4 For convenience, for every j ∈ N we
denote N−j = N \ {j}, v−j = vN\{j} and L−j = L(N \ {j}).
Axiom 4.7 Balanced contributions
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG satisfies balanced
contributions if for any (N, v, L, {N}) ∈ GCG it holds that
fi(N, v, L, {N})−fi(N−j, v−j, L−j, {N−j}) = fj(N, v, L, {N})−fj(N−i, v−i, L−i, {N−i}),
for all i, j ∈ N .
The following collective balanced contributions axiom is a generalization to the setting
of TU-games with coalition and graph structure of the collective balanced contributions
axiom for TU-games with coalition structure of Kamijo (2011). It states that, given two
different unions Pk and Ph in P , for every i ∈ Pk and j ∈ Ph, the loss in value that player i
experiences when union Ph ∈ P leaves the game is equal to the loss in value that player j
experiences when union Pk ∈ P leaves the game.5 Again for convenience, for every h ∈M
we denote N−Ph = N \ Ph, v−Ph = vN\Ph , L−Ph = L(N \ Ph) and P−Ph = P\{Ph}.
4Note that Myerson (1980) defined balanced contributions for conference structures on a fixed player
set. In his model, instead of a player leaving the game, all feasible coalitions containing this player are no
longer feasible but, by definition, the player stays connected as a singleton.
5Although it is easy to formulate balanced contributions for a fixed player set, it is more difficult to
state collective balanced contributions on a fixed player set since we need to specify how the players in Ph
‘stay’ in the game. Therefore, these axioms are more different than their name might suggest.
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Axiom 4.8 Collective balanced contributions
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG satisfies col-
lective balanced contributions if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG with |P | ≥ 2 it holds that
fi(N, v, L, P )−fi(N−Ph , v−Ph , L−Ph , P−Ph) = fj(N, v, L, P )−fj(N−Pk , v−Pk , L−Pk , P−Pk)
for every two different unions Pk and Ph in P , and all i ∈ Pk ∈ P , and all j ∈ Ph ∈ P .
The axioms 4.6-4.8 characterize the graph-partition value.
Theorem 4.9 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG
satisfies graph efficiency, balanced contributions and collective balanced contributions if and
only if f(N, v, L, P ) = φ(N, v, L, P ) for every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG.
Proof. First, we show that φ satisfies graph efficiency, balanced contributions and collec-
tive balanced contributions. Graph efficiency follows from∑
i∈N
φi(N, v, L, P ) =
∑
i∈N
Shi(N, v
L|P ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∆vL|P (S)
|S| =
∑
S⊆N
∆vL|P (S) = v
L|P (N) =
∑
S∈N/P
vL(S) = vL(N) =
∑
K∈CL(N)
v(K),
where the first, second, fifth and seventh equalities follow by definition, the third by re-
arranging terms, the fourth by the expression for the dividends and the sixth because
N/P = N .
Next, for every pair i, j ∈ N it holds that
φi(N, v, L, {N})− φi(N−j, v−j, L−j, {N−j}) =
Shi(N, v
L|{N})− Shi(N−j, (v−j)L−j |{N−j}) = Shi(N, vL)− Shi(N−j, (v−j)L−j) =
Myi(N, v, L)−Myi(N−j, v−j, L−j) = Myj(N, v, L)−Myj(N−i, v−i, L−i) =
Shj(N, v
L)− Shj(N−i, (v−i)L−i) = Shj(N, vL|{N})− Shj(N−i, (v−i)L−i |{N−i}) =
φj(N, v, L, {N})− φj(N−i, v−i, L−i, {N−i}),
where the fourth equality follows because the value of Myerson (1977) satisfies balanced
contributions for TU-games with graph structure6 and all the others follow by definition.
Hence, φ satisfies balanced contributions.
6This follows similar as shown in Myerson (1980) for a fixed player set.
14
Finally, given L ∈ LN and Pj ∈ P ∈ PN consider the TU-games (N−Pj , (v−Pj)L−Pj ) and
(N−Pj , (v
L)−Pj). Because for all S ⊆ N \ Pj it holds that
(v−Pj)
L−Pj (S) =
∑
T∈CL−Pj (S)
v−Pj(T ) =
∑
T∈CL−Pj (S)
v(T ) = vL−Pj (S) = vL(S) = (vL)−Pj(S),
these games are equal. Now consider any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG with |P | ≥ 2 and take any
i ∈ Pk ∈ P and any j ∈ Pl ∈ P , Pk 6= Pl. Then,
φi(N, v, L, P )− φi(N−Pl , v−Pl , L−Pl , P−Pl) =
Kai(N, v
L, P )−Kai(N−Pl , (v−Pl)L−Pl , P−Pl) = Kai(N, vL, P )−Kai(N−Pl , (vL)−Pl , P−Pl) =
Kaj(N, v
L, P )−Kaj(N−Pk , (vL)−Pk , P−Pk) = Kaj(N, vL, P )−Kaj(N−Pk , (v−Pk)L−Pk , P−Pk) =
φj(N, v, L, P )− φj(N−Pk , v−Pk , L−Pk , P−Pk),
where the first and last equality follow by definition, the second and fourth because the
TU-games in the expressions are equal and the third because the value of Kamijo (2011) sat-
isfies collective balanced contributions for TU-games with coalition structure (see Kamijo
(2011)). Hence, φ satisfies collective balanced contributions.
Second, we show that there can be at most one value that satisfies graph efficiency, bal-
anced contributions and collective balanced contributions. Suppose that f satisfies these
axioms and consider first all games (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG with P = {N}. We uniquely deter-
mine f(N, v, L, P ) for these games by induction on the number of players n. When n = 1 it
follows directly from graph efficiency that fi({i}, v, L, {{i}}) = v({i}) = φi({i}, v, L, {{i}}),
i ∈ N . Next, suppose that f has been uniquely determined for all games (K, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG
with P = {K} and |K| ≤ n− 1. Then applying the balanced contributions property to f
for (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG with P = {N} and |N | = n gives
fi(N, v, L, {N})−fi(N−j, v−j, L−j, {N−j}) = fj(N, v, L, {N})−fj(N−i, v−i, L−i, {N−i})
for all i, j ∈ N . Notice that for all i, j ∈ N , the values fi(N−j, v−j, L−j, {N−j}) and
fj(N−i, v−i, L−i, {N−i}) are known by the induction hypothesis. For some particular i ∈ N ,
say i = i0, there are n− 1 equations of this type with i = i0. Together with the efficiency
equation∑
i∈N
fi(N, v, L, {N}) = v(N)
these form a system of (n−1)+1 = n linearly independent equations and so these equations
uniquely determine fi(N, v, L, {N}), i ∈ N .
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Finally, consider all games (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG with |P | ≥ 2. Suppose that there
are two different values f 1 and f 2 that both satisfy graph efficiency, balanced contribu-
tions and collective balanced contributions. Let P be a partition with a minimum num-
ber of unions (elements of P ) such that f 1(N, v, L, P ) 6= f 2(N, v, L, P ). It follows by
the minimality of P that if Ph is any element of P , then f
1(N−Ph , v−Ph , L−Ph , P−Ph) =
f 2(N−Ph , v−Ph , L−Ph , P−Ph). Now, by collective balanced contributions (and rearranging
terms) we have for all i ∈ Pk ∈ P and all j ∈ Pl ∈ P , Pk 6= Pl, that
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 1j (N, v, L, P ) = f 1i (N−Pl , v−Pl , L−Pl , P−Pl)− f 1j (N−Pk , v−Pk , L−Pk , P−Pk) =
f 2i (N−Pl , v−Pl , L−Pl , P−Pl)−f 2j (N−Pk , v−Pk , L−Pk , P−Pk) = f 2i (N, v, L, P )−f 2j (N, v, L, P ).
Hence, f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 2i (N, v, L, P ) = f 1j (N, v, L, P )− f 2j (N, v, L, P ) for any i ∈ Pk ∈ P
and j ∈ Pl ∈ P , Pk 6= Pl. This, in turn, implies that there exists an α ∈ IR such that
f 1i (N, v, L, P ) − f 2i (N, v, L, P ) = α, for all i ∈ N . It follows from graph efficiency that∑
i∈N f
1
i (N, v, L, P ) =
∑
K∈CL(N) v(K) =
∑
i∈N f
2
i (N, v, L, P ) so that
0 =
∑
i∈N
(
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 2i (N, v, L, P )
)
= |N |α.
Since |N | > 0 this means that α = 0, so that f 1(N, v, L, P ) = f 2(N, v, L, P ), a contradic-
tion. 2
Replacing graph efficiency by efficiency, it can be shown in a similar way as in Kamijo
(2011) that we obtain a characterization of the collective value on the class of games with
coalition and graph structure. Since graph efficiency takes into account that the players
in N can only realize the sum of the worths of the components of the graph L, the value
φ can be seen as a modification of Kamijo’s collective value defined on the class of games
with only a coalition structure to the class of games with coalition and graph structure.
Proposition 4.10 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
GCG satisfies efficiency, balanced contributions and collective balanced contributions if and
only if f(N, v, L, P ) = Ka(N, v, P ) for all i ∈ N and every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG.
4.2 Characterization of the partition-graph value
The partition-graph value can be characterized by axioms similar to those that characterize
the Myerson value for graph games. First, recall that component efficiency of Myerson
(1977) for graph games states that players in one component of the graph share exactly
the worth of their component. This axiom is stated in terms of games with coalition and
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graph structure in Va´zquez-Brage et al. (1996) and implies that for every component K
in CL(N) the players of K distribute the worth v(K) among themselves.7
Axiom 4.11 Component efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG is component
efficient if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG it holds that
∑
i∈K fi(N, v, L, P ) = v(K), for all
K ∈ CL(N).
The partition-graph value does not satisfy this axiom in general, because it takes into
account that within a component K of L players can only realize the sum of the worths of
the coalitions T in K/P . However, it satisfies that the players in every component K of
L distribute the worths of the coalitions in K/P among themselves, as stated in the next
axiom.
Axiom 4.12 Partition component efficiency
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG is parti-
tion component efficient if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG it holds that
∑
i∈K fi(N, v, L, P ) =∑
T∈K/P v(T ), for all K ∈ CL(N).
When L is connected, then N is the unique component of L and also the unique element
of N/P . In this case partition component efficiency implies efficiency.
Next, Myerson (1977)’s fairness for TU-games with graph structure is translated to
the setting of TU-games with coalition and graph structure. We require that, given two
players i and j that are linked in the graph L (i.e. {i, j} ∈ L), both their values change by
the same amount when the link between them is severed. To simplify notation we write
L \ {i, j} instead of L \ {{i, j}}.
Axiom 4.13 Fairness
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG is fair if for
any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG it holds that
fi(N, v, L, P )− fi(N, v, L\{i, j}, P ) = fj(N, v, L, P )− fj(N, v, L\{i, j}, P )
for all i, j ∈ N such that {i, j} ∈ L.
The axioms 4.12 and 4.13 characterize the partition-graph value.
Theorem 4.14 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
GCG satisfies partition component efficiency and fairness if and only if f(N, v, L, P ) =
ψ(N, v, L, P ) for every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG.
7Note that any solution for TU-games with graph and coalition structure that satisfies component
efficiency, also satisfies graph efficiency.
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Proof. First, we show that ψ satisfies partition component efficiency and fairness. For
every K ∈ CL(N) we have∑
i∈K
ψi(N, v, L, P ) =
∑
i∈K
Shi(N, (v|P )L) =
∑
i∈K
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∆(v|P )L(S)
|S| =
∑
S⊆K
∆(v|P )L(S) = (v|P )L(K) =
∑
S∈CL(K)
v|P (S) = v|P (K) =
∑
T∈K/P
v(T ),
where the first two equalities follow by definition, the third by rearranging terms, the
fourth by the expression for the dividends and the last three again by definition. Hence,
ψ satisfies partition component efficiency.
Next, for every pair i, j ∈ N such that {i, j} ∈ L we have
ψi(N, v, L, P )− ψi(N, v, L\{i, j}, P ) = Myi(N, v|P , L)−Myi(N, v|P , L\{i, j}) =
Myj(N, v|P , L)−Myj(N, v|P , L\{i, j}) = ψj(N, v, L, P )− ψj(N, v, L\{i, j}, P ),
where the first and the last equality follow by definition and the second because the value of
Myerson (1977) satisfies fairness for TU-games with graph structure (see Myerson (1977)).
So, ψ satisfies fairness.
Second, we show that there can be at most one value that satisfies partition component
efficiency and fairness. This proceeds along the same lines as the first part of the proof
of the Theorem in Myerson (1977). If i ∈ K ∈ CL(N) with |K| = 1, then partition
component efficiency determines that fi(N, v, L, P ) = ψi(N, v, L, P ).
Next, suppose that there are two different values f 1 and f 2 that both satisfy parti-
tion component efficiency and fairness. Let L be a graph with a minimum number of
links (elements of L) such that f 1(N, v, L, P ) 6= f 2(N, v, L, P ) (note that |L| > 0 in
this case.) If {i, j} ∈ L is a given link of L then it follows by the minimality of L
that f 1(N, v, L\{i, j}, P ) = f 2(N, v, L\{i, j}, P ). By the fairness axiom (and rearranging
terms) we therefore have that
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 1j (N, v, L, P ) = f 1i (N, v, L\{i, j}, P )− f 1j (N, v, L\{i, j}, P ) =
f 2i (N, v, L\{i, j}, P )− f 2j (N, v, L\{i, j}, P ) = f 2i (N, v, L, P )− f 2j (N, v, L, P ).
Since this holds for any {i, j} ∈ L it also holds for all i, j ∈ K ∈ CL(N). Hence there
exists an αK(L) ∈ IR such that
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 2i (N, v, L, P ) = αK(L)
for all i ∈ K ∈ CL(N). Note that αK(L) depends only on K and L but not on i. It
follows from partition component efficiency that
∑
i∈K f
1
i (N, v, L, P ) =
∑
T∈K/P v(T ) =
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∑
i∈K f
2
i (N, v, L, P ) so that
0 =
∑
i∈K
(
f 1i (N, v, L, P )− f 2i (N, v, L, P )
)
= |K|αK(L).
Since |K| > 1 this implies that αK(L) = 0, so that f 1(N, v, L, P ) = f 2(N, v, L, P ), a
contradiction. 2
Replacing partition component efficiency by component efficiency, it can be shown in a
similar way as in Myerson (1977) that we obtain a characterization of the Myerson value on
the class of games with coalition and graph structure. Since partition component efficiency
takes into account that the players of a component K of L can only realize the sum of the
worths of the elements of K/P , the value ψ can be seen as a modification of the Myerson
value defined on the class of games with only a graph structure to the class of games with
coalition and graph structure.
Proposition 4.15 A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure
GCG satisfies component efficiency and fairness if and only if f(N, v, L, P ) = My(N, v, L)
for every (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG.
5 An economic example
In this section we give an economic example of TU-games with coalition and graph structure.8
Consider an international network of natural gas pipelines. Such a network can be rep-
resented by a graph, where the nodes in the graph correspond to cities and the links in
the graph to pipelines between the cities. The international aspect of the network can be
captured by the coalition structure where cities that are located in the same country are
elements of the same union in the coalition structure.
As an illustration, suppose that there are five cities N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. City 1 supplies
natural gas and cities 2, 4 and 5 have demand for it. The cities are only able to trade
the natural gas through the negotiation of (binding) bi- or multilateral contracts so that
we can represent this situation by a TU-game. When city 1 sells its natural gas to city 2
this creates a surplus of 3, but when it sells it to city 4 or 5 it creates a surplus of 10. In
terms of a TU-game this would mean that v({1, 2}) = 3, v({1, 4}) = 10, v({1, 5}) = 10.
When city 3 would join the coalition of city 1 and 2, city 1 and 4 or city 1 and 5 this would
have no effect on the worth of the coalition because city 3 has no demand for natural gas.
8Political applications are given in Va´zquez-Brage et al. (1996) and in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2009).
They applied their values to situations of political power in parliaments with coalition and graph structured
relations between its members.
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Figure 2: International network of natural gas pipelines.
Hence, v({1, 2, 3}) = 3, v({1, 3, 4}) = 10 and v({1, 3, 5}) = 10. However, when city 1, 2
and 4, city 1,2 and 5 or city 1,4 and 5 decide to cooperate, city 1 supplies some natural
gas to both of the cities that have demand for it so that v({1, 2, 4}) = 11, v({1, 2, 5}) = 11
and v({1, 4, 5}) = 11. Also now, when city 3 joins this has no effect: v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 11,
v({1, 2, 3, 5}) = 11, v({1, 3, 4, 5}) = 11. Finally, when city 1 cooperates with cities 2, 4 and
5 or with all cities this creates a surplus of 12, v({1, 2, 4, 5}) = 12, v({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) = 12.
When we let v(S) be zero for any other coalition S we obtain a TU-game.
In this TU-game city 1 is able to supply natural gas to the other cities without any
restrictions. In reality, though, the delivery of natural gas to a city requires a system of
pipelines. Suppose that there is such a system of pipelines between the cities and that this
system can be represented by the graph L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}}. This network
of natural gas pipelines is displayed in Figure 2. What is interesting about this network
is that, although city 3 has no demand for natural gas, it is in between city 1, 4 and 5 so
that it is necessary in establishing cooperation between any of the coalitions involving at
least two of these cities.
As a last step we introduce the countries in which the five cities are located. Cities 1
and 2 are located in country 1, P1 = {1, 2}, city 3 is located in country 2, P2 = {3} and
cities 4 and 5 are located in country 3, P3 = {4, 5}, so that P = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5}}. This
coalition structure implies that cities can cooperate within their country and that countries
can cooperate (and when they do so force all their constituent cities to cooperate). For
example, city 1 is able to cooperate with city 2 because they are located in the same
country, but city 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not able to cooperate in a coalition because this would
require the approval of city 5 (which is in the same country as city 4).
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We now have a TU-game with coalition and graph structure (N, v, L, P ) that represents
the cooperation possibilities of the cities that are able to trade natural gas using an inter-
national network of pipelines. A question that we can now ask ourselves is the following:
what is the payoff that a city can expect facing the situation described above. Or, in the
words of Shapley: what is the a priori assessment of the utility of becoming involved in the
TU-game with coalition and graph structure (N, v, L, P ) for each city? Different values
provide different answers to this question, as can be seen in Table 5.1.
Player Sh My Ka V GC φ ψ
1 72
3
4 1
10
33
4
3 3 3
10
3 3
10
2 2
3
4 1
10
33
4
3 3 3
10
3 3
10
3 0 23
5
0 3 14
5
14
5
4 15
6
3
5
21
4
11
2
14
5
14
5
5 15
6
3
5
21
4
11
2
14
5
14
5
Table 5.1 Comparison between various values.
In Table 5.1, Sh represents the value that assigns to every TU-game with coalition and
graph structure the Shapley value of the unrestricted game, i.e. Shi(N, v, L, P ) = Shi(N, v)
for all i ∈ N . Similarly, My(N, v, L, P ) = My(N, v, L) and Ka(N, v, L, P ) = Ka(N, v, P ).
The V GC value is the value for TU-games with coalition and graph structure proposed
in Va´zquez-Brage et al. (1996) and the values φ and ψ are the graph-partition value,
respectively the partition-graph value.9
What is interesting, but not surprising, about these values is that the Shapley value
and the collective value assign a value of zero to city 3. The reason for this is that these
values do not take into account the role that city 3 plays in the network of natural gas
pipelines. The Myerson value does take this into account, but does not consider the fact
that the cities are located in several countries. This explains why the Myerson value gives
a relatively low value to city 4 and 5, that are located in the same country. Further, it
seems that the VCG value overestimates the role of city 3. The two new values φ and
ψ, which happen to be equivalent in this example, are therefore, in our opinion, the most
reasonable payoff expectations for the cities in this example.
9Since the values of Alonso-Meijide et al. (2009) are not efficient, these values are not included in the
table.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduced two new values for TU-games with coalition and graph struc-
ture. The first is the Shapley value of the graph-partition restricted TU-game, a game
in which the dividend of any coalition that is neither a subset of a union nor a union of
unions is zero. The second is the Shapley value of the partition-graph restricted TU-game,
a game in which the dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero.
We showed that the Shapley value of the graph-partition restricted TU-game can be char-
acterized by the axioms of graph efficiency, balanced contributions and collective balanced
contributions, and that the Shapley value of the partition-graph restricted TU-game can
be characterized by the axioms of partition component efficiency and fairness. Finally, we
applied our values to an economic example of cities, located in several countries, trading
natural gas through a network of pipelines. In future research we plan to investigate when,
and how, the two values that we introduced in this paper differ and which value is the
more appropriate one to apply in specific situations.
Finally, we would like to remark that the axioms characterizing the two new values in
Theorem 4.9, respectively 4.14 are logically independent. In addition, the partition-graph
value ψ also satisfies balanced contributions, which follows immediately from the fact that
this property is also satisfied by the Myerson value. In contrast, the graph-partition value
φ does not satisfy fairness. However, we could separate the fairness axiom by distinguishing
the deletion of links between players in the same union from the deletion of links between
players from different unions.
Axiom 6.1 Internal fairness
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG satisfies internal
fairness if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG it holds that
fi(N, v, L, P )− fi(N, v, L\{i, j}, P ) = fj(N, v, L, P )− fj(N, v, L\{i, j}, P )
for all i, j ∈ N such that {i, j} ∈ L and {i, j} ⊆ Pk for some k ∈M .
Axiom 6.2 External fairness
A value f on the class of TU-games with coalition and graph structure GCG satisfies external
fairness if for any (N, v, L, P ) ∈ GCG it holds that
fi(N, v, L, P )− fi(N, v, L\{i, j}, P ) = fj(N, v, L, P )− fj(N, v, L\{i, j}, P )
for all i, j ∈ N such that {i, j} ∈ L, i ∈ Pk, j ∈ Pq for k, q ∈M, k 6= q.
Now, it can be shown that the graph-partition value φ satisfies internal fairness, but
does not satisfy external fairness. In fact, ‘combining’ the uniqueness parts of the proofs
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of Theorems 4.9 and 4.14, it can be shown that there is at most one value satisfying graph
efficiency, internal fairness and collective balanced contributions, showing that these ax-
ioms characterize the graph-partition value φ. Comparing this last axiomatization of the
graph-partition value φ with the given axiomatization of the partition-graph value ψ, we
see that both are characterized by an internal axiom (they both satisfy internal fairness
as well as balanced contributions), an external axiom (collective balanced contributions,
respectively, external fairness) and an efficiency axiom (graph efficiency, respectively, par-
tition component efficiency). We summarize the properties in Table 6.3.
My Ka φ ψ
efficiency +
graph efficiency + +
component efficiency +
partition component efficiency +
balanced contributions + + + +
collective balanced contributions + +
fairness + + +
internal fairness + + + +
external fairness + + +
Table 6.3 Table of axioms satisfied by the values.
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